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Abstract
In production economies with unequal labor skills, one of the
intrinsic features for Nash implementation problems is the lack
of information about individual skills, which makes the planner
ignorant to the set of feasible allocations in advance of produc-
tion. Given this intrinsic feature, the paper ﬁrstly introduces a
new axiom, Non-manipulability of Irrelevant Skills (NIS), which
together with Maskin Monotonicity constitute the necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for Nash implementation. Secondly, the pa-
per deﬁn e ss o m ec o n d i t i o n sf o rn a t u ral mechanisms which seem
relevant, and then shows that any eﬃcient allocation rule is Nash-
implementable by the natural mechanisms if and only if it sat-
isﬁes a slightly stronger variation of NIS and Supporting Price
Independence. Following these characterizations, it is shown that
there is a Maskin monotonic allocation rule which is not imple-
mentable when information about individual skills is absent. In
contrast, there are many fair allocation rules which are known
to be non-implementable in the present literature, but are imple-
mentable by the natural mechanisms given in this paper.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: C72, D51, D78, D82
Keywords: Unequal labor skills; Nash implementation; Non-
manipulability of Irrelevant Skills
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11 Introduction
In this paper, Nash implementation of desired resource allocations is dis-
cussed in production economies with possibly unequal labor skills. A typical
example of such economies is a ﬁshery, where mechanism design for Nash
implementation is of practical interest: in ﬁsheries, each individual’s free
operation may lead to an overexploitation of resources with little regard
to future sustainability, and so many countries with the ﬁshery as one of
their major industries work on resource management, and employ incentive
schemes to control individuals’ operation. For instance, in Norway, the har-
vesting of marine resources is regulated to ensure that the capacity of the
(source) stocks are able to renew themselves.123 Given that the total allow-
able catch (TAC) in the Barents Sea is allocated through negotiations under
international agreements, the country’s quotas are distributed among diﬀer-
ent groups of ﬁshermen, and then subdivided and allocated among ﬁshing
boats in each group, which constitutes desired resource allocations. With
this in mind, the resource management mechanism in Norway is expected
to implement such allocations of ﬁshing by monitoring and punishing each
ﬁshing boat’s overexploitation of resources.
Most of the vast literature on implementation theory presumes that the
social planner cannot know each individual’s preference but knows the set
of feasible alternatives. In economic environments, however, there are many
examples of resource allocation problems in which each individual’s private
information consists of not only her preferences but also her endowments
and/or human capital. In such problems, as Jackson (2001) pointed out, the
planner may not know in advance the set of feasible alternatives (feasible
allocations), since it is endogenously ﬁxed due to individuals’ strategies on
1Sustainable management requires knowledge of the size of the stocks, their age com-
position, their distribution, and the environment in which they live. Every year, data from
Norwegian scientiﬁcs u r v e y sa n df r o mﬁshermen are compared with data from other coun-
tries (Norwegian marine scientists cooperate closely with researchers from other countries,
especially Russia) and assessed by the International Council for Exploration of the Sea
(ICES).
2This is in accordance with international agreements including the 1982 UN Law of the
Sea Convention, the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct
for Responsible Fisheries.
3Recently, the ecosystem approach is increasingly being applied to Norwegian ﬁsheries
management. It not only takes into account how harvesting aﬀects ﬁsh stocks, but also
how the ﬁsheries aﬀect the marine environment for living marine resources in general.
2how to utilize their own endowments or human capital, which the social
planner may have no control over. Given this setting, it is necessary to extend
the classical framework of implementation theory into the framework with
endogenous feasible allocations that allows each individual to misrepresent
not only her preference but also her endowments or human capital.
It was Hurwicz et al. (1995) which provided a systematic analysis of
endogenous feasible allocations in Nash implementation under economic en-
vironments, and there is also some literature such as Tian and Li (1995);
Hong (1995); Tian (1999, 2000, 2009) which addresses the above issue in
designing a mechanism to implement a speciﬁcs o c i a lc h o i c ec o r r e s p o n d e n c e
(SCC) like the Walrasian solution. In these works, each individual is allowed
to understate (or withhold) her own material endowments, but she is not al-
lowed to overstate them, since the planner is assumed to require individuals
to “place the claimed endowments on the table” [Hurwicz et al. (1995)].
In production economies with unequal skills, however, one of the essen-
tial features is that each individual is allowed to not only understate but also
overstate her endowment of labor skill, since here the planner cannot require
individuals to place the claimed endowments of their skills on the table in
advance of production. Among several papers4 on implementation in produc-
tion economies, there are a few works such as Yamada and Yoshihara (2007,
2008) which address this essential feature, and then discuss implementation
under some stringent restriction on available mechanisms.
In contrast to the above literature, this paper ﬁrstly imposes no restriction
on the available class of mechanisms and then provides a general (necessary
and suﬃcient) characterization of Nash-implementable (eﬃcient) SCCsi n
production economies with unequal skills. It is Monotonicity (M)[ M a s k i n
(1999)] which is the necessary and suﬃcient condition for Nash implemen-
tation in production economies if the endowments of skills are known to the
planner, though this characterization no longer holds if they are unknown.
Thus, this paper introduces a new condition, called Non-manipulability of
Irrelevant Skills (NIS), which together with M fully characterize Nash-
implementable SCCsi ns u c hp r o b l e m s . T h ea x i o mNIS requires indepen-
dence of a particular change in individual skills, which is weak enough in the
4In addition to the above mentioned literature, for instance, Suh (1995), Yoshihara
(1999), Kaplan and Wettstein (2000), and Tian (2009) have proposed simple or natural
mechanisms to implement particular SCCs, whereas Shin and Suh (1997) and Yoshi-
hara (2000) have discussed characterizations of SCCs implementable by simple or natural
mechanisms.
3s e n s et h a ta n ye ﬃcient SCC satisﬁes it in economies with strictly concave
production functions, but it is by no means trivial. Actually, as shown be-
low, there is an economically meaningful SCC, called the maximal workfare
solution,w h i c hs a t i s ﬁes M,b u tn o tNIS in economies with linear produc-
tion functions. Thus, though this solution is implementable in the classical
framework where the endowments of skills are known to the planner, it is
non-implementable in the extended framework where they are unknown.
Secondly, this paper deﬁnes a class of natural mechanisms applied to these
economies, and then provides a full characterization of SCCsi m p l e m e n t a b l e
by them. To deﬁne what natural mechanisms are in these economies, it is
worth mentioning the practical applicability of the above mentioned resource
management mechanism in Norway, which implements desired allocations of
ﬁshing to preserve the living marine resources for future sustainability, while
letting the ﬁshing boats operate freely within their quotas and claim as their
due share what they produced.5 Taking this property as primarily relevant in
production economies, the paper considers labor sovereignty [Kranich (1994);
Gotoh et al. (2005)] as a condition of natural mechanisms. This requires
each individual to have the right of choosing her own labor hours, and the
outcome functions of such mechanisms simply distribute the produced output
to agents, according to the information they provided and the record of their
labor hours completed. The paper also introduces forthrightness [Dutta et
al. (1995); Saijo et al. (1996, 1999)], and deﬁnes natural mechanisms as
feasible ones satisfying these two conditions and having strategy spaces of
price-quantity annoucements.
Note that the conditions of natural mechanisms are slightly weaker than
that of the restricted mechanisms (we call simple mechanisms here) dis-
cussed in Yamada and Yoshihara (2007). This is because one peculiar con-
dition imposed on simple mechanisms is not present in natural mechanisms.
Correspondingly, the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for naturally imple-
5In more detail, this mechanism requires ocean-going vessels to install and use satellite-
based tracking equipment that enables the authorities to continually monitor their opera-
tions, though the volume of each individual boat’s catch is not easily identiﬁed. Therefore,
the adherence to the government imposed harvest quota cannot reasonably be measured
by the government for each individual ﬁsher’s catch, but rather measured by the increase
or decrease of the remaining ﬁsh resources. The following quota is then adjusted accord-
ingly up or down relevant to this change: if a decrease in the amount of the resource is
conﬁrmed, then catch of the ﬁsh in question is partially or totally prohibited for a length
of time.
4mentable SCCsi nt h i sp a p e ra r eSupporting Price Independence (SPI)[ G a s -
part (1998); Yoshihara (1998)] and Non-manipulability of Irrelevant Skills∗
(NIS∗) which is slightly stronger than NIS.N o t et h a tSPI and NIS∗ are
slightly weaker than SPI and Independence of Unused Skills (IUS)[ Y a -
mada and Yoshihara (2007)], where the latter two conditions characterize
simple implementation as in Yamada and Yoshihara (2007). Surprisingly,
though most of the well-known fair allocation rules are non-implementable
in Yamada and Yoshihara (2007), they become implementable by the natural
mechanisms. Actually, as it is shown below, any eﬃcient SCC satisfying
non-discrimination [Thomson (1983)] also satisﬁes NIS∗, though many of
them do not satisfy IUS, so that many of such SCCsa r ei m p l e m e n t a b l eb y
the natural mechanisms.
The model is deﬁned in Section 2. In section 3 and 4 we respectively
provide characterizations of Nash implementation and natural implementa-
tion, and in section 5 we give some examples of implemantable and non-
implementable SCCs. Concluding remarks appear in Section 6.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
There are two goods, one of which is an input (labor time) x ∈ R+ to be used
to produce the other good y ∈ R+.6 T h e r ei sas e tN = {1,...,n} of agents,
where 2 ≤ n<+∞.E a c ha g e n ti0s consumption is denoted by zi =( xi,y i),
where xi denotes her labor time, and yi t h ea m o u n to fh e ro u t p u t .A l la g e n t s
face a common upper bound of labor time ¯ x ,w h e r e0 < ¯ x<+∞,a n ds o
h a v et h es a m ec o n s u m p t i o ns e tZ ≡ [0, ¯ x] × R+.
Each i0s preference is deﬁned on Z and represented by a utility func-
tion ui : Z → R, which is continuous and quasi-concave on Z,a n ds t r i c t l y
monotonic (decreasing in labor time and increasing in the share of output)
on
◦
Z≡ [0, ¯ x)×R++.7 We use U to denote the class of such utility functions.
M o r e o v e r ,w ei m p o s ea na d d i t i o n a lc o n d i t i o no nU as follows:




i,0) ∈ Z, ui (zi) >u i (z0
i).
Each i has a labor skill si ∈ R++. The universal set of skills for all
6The symbol R+ denotes the set of non-negative real numbers.
7The symbol R++ denotes the set of positive real numbers.
5agents is denoted by S = R++.8 The labor skill si ∈ S is i0s eﬀective labor
supply p e rh o u rm e a s u r e di ne ﬃciency units. It can also be interpreted as i0s
labor intensity exercised in production.9 Thus, if the agent’s labor time
is xi ∈ [0, ¯ x] and her labor skill si ∈ S,t h e nsixi ∈ R+ denotes the agent’s
eﬀective labor contribution to production measured in eﬃciency units.
The production technology is a function f : R+ → R+, that is continuous,
strictly increasing, concave, and such that f (0) = 0.F o r s i m p l i c i t y ,w e ﬁx
f. Thus, an economy is a pair of proﬁles e ≡ (u,s) with u=( ui)i∈N ∈ Un
and s=( si)i∈N ∈ Sn. Denote the class of such economies by E ≡ Un ×S n.
Given s∈ Sn, an allocation z=( xi,y i)i∈N ∈ Zn is feasible for s if P
yi ≤ f (
P
sixi).D e n o t eb yZ (s) the set of feasible allocations for s∈ Sn.
Given s∈ Sn, a feasible allocation z∈ Z (s) is interior if zi ∈
◦
Z for all
i ∈ N.D e n o t e b y
◦
Z (s) the set of interior feasible allocations for s∈ Sn.
An allocation z=( zi)i∈N ∈ Zn is Pareto eﬃcient for e =( u,s) ∈ E if
z∈ Z (s) and there does not exist z0 =( z0
i)i∈N ∈ Z (s) such that for all
i ∈ N, ui (z0
i) ≥ ui (zi),a n df o rs o m ei ∈ N, ui (z0
i) >u i (zi).L e t P (e)
denote the set of Pareto eﬃcient allocations for e ∈ E.A social choice
correspondence (SCC)o rsolution is a correspondence ϕ : E ³ Zn such
that for each e =( u,s) ∈ E, ϕ(e) ⊆
◦
Z (s) ∩ P (e).G i v e n ϕ, z∈ Zn is
ϕ-optimal for e ∈ E if z∈ ϕ(e).
Let Ai,f o re a c hi ∈ N,d e n o t et h estrategy space of agent i.W e
call ai ∈ Ai a strategy of agent i ∈ N,a n da ∈ A ≡ ×i∈NAi a strategy
proﬁle. For any a ∈ A and i ∈ N,l e ta−i be the list (aj)j∈N\{i} ∈ ×j∈N\{i}Aj
of elements of the proﬁle a for all agents except i. Denote the set of such
a−i by A−i for each i ∈ N. Given a list a−i ∈ A−i and a strategy ai ∈ Ai
of agent i,w ed e n o t eb y(ai,a−i) the proﬁle consisting of these ai and a−i.
A mechanism or game form γ is a pair γ =( A,h),w h e r eh : A → Zn is
the outcome function such that, for each a ∈ A, h(a)=( hi (a))i∈N ∈ Zn.
8For any two sets X and Y , X ⊆ Y whenever any x ∈ X also belongs to Y ,a n dX = Y
if and only if X ⊆ Y and Y ⊆ X.
9It might be more natural to deﬁne labor skill and labor intensity in a discriminative
way: for example, if si ∈ S is i’s labor skill, then i’s labor intensity is a variable si,w h e r e
0 <s i ≤ si. In such a formulation, we may view the amount of si as being determined
endogenously by the agent i. In spite of this more natural view, we will assume in the
following discussion that the labor intensity is a constant value, si = si, for the sake
of simplicity. The main theorems in the following discussion would remain valid with a
few changes in the settings of the economic environments even if the labor intensity were
assumed to be varied.
6Denote the unversal set of such game forms by Γ.
Given γ ∈ Γ, for each economy e ∈ E, a (non-cooperative) game is given
by (N,γ,e). Fixing the set of players N,w es i m p l yd e n o t eag a m e(N,γ,e)
by (γ,e).G i v e nag a m e(γ,e),ap r o ﬁle a∗ ∈ A is a (pure-strategy) Nash








.L e t NE(γ,e) denote the set of Nash equilibria of (γ,e).
An allocation z =( xi,y i)i∈N ∈ Zn is a Nash equilibrium allocation of
(γ,e) if there exists a ∈ NE(γ,e) such that h(a)=z.L e t NA(γ,e)
denote the set of Nash equilibrium allocations of (γ,e).Am e c h a n i s mγ ∈ Γ
implements ϕ in Nash equilibria if for each e ∈ E, NA(γ,e)=ϕ(e).
An SCC ϕ is implementable if there exists a mechanism γ ∈ Γ which
implements ϕ in Nash equilibria.
Among various types of mechanisms in Γ, we are interested in mecha-
nisms having the property of labor sovereignty [Kranich (1994); Gotoh et.
al (2005)],10 which says that every agent can choose freely her own labor time.
As such, we focus on the following types of mechanisms. For each i ∈ N,
let her strategy space be Ai ≡ Mi × [0, ¯ x], with generic element (mi,x i).
Note that here Mi stands for an abstract general message space as in clas-
sical mechanisms, while the members of [0, ¯ x], which represent i’s choice of
labor time as part of her observable action, are also considered as a strategic
variable for i.L e ty ∈ R+ be the total output the coordinator observes after
production.T h e n ,asharing mechanism is a function g : A × R+ → Rn
+
such that for each (m,x) ∈ A and each y ∈ R+, g(m,x,y)=y for some
y ∈ Rn
+. A sharing mechanism g is feasible if for each (m,x) ∈ A and
each y ∈ R+,
P
gi (m,x,y) ≤ y. W ed e n o t eb yG (resp. G∗)t h ec l a s so f
all sharing (resp. feasible sharing) mechanisms. In the following discussion,
we assume that the production technology function f is known and the to-
tal output after production is observable to the coordinator. Thus, for each
s ∈ Sn and each x ∈ [0, ¯ x]
n, y = f (
P
sjxj) is known to the coordinator after
production, without the true information about s.11 Then, g ∈ G∗ implies
that for each s ∈ Sn and each (m,x) ∈ A, (x,g(m,x,f(
P
sjxj))) ∈ Z (s).
10The previous mechanisms such as Suh (1995), Yoshihara (1999, 2000a), Tian (2000)
do not have this property.
11Since the coordinator also knows f and x,h ec a nﬁgure out that the true skill proﬁle
belongs to the hyperplane
©
s ∈ Sn | s·x = f−1 (y)
ª
. However, the exact location of the
true skill proﬁle in this hyperplane cannot be ﬁgured out. Note that, to see which of the
feasible allocations are true ϕ-optimal allocations, one needs to know the information of
t h et r u es k i l lp r o ﬁle.
7In the following discussion, for each g ∈ G, we simply write a value of g
as g(m,x) instead of g(m,x,f(
P
sjxj)) except for when we deﬁne new
mechanisms in G.
Given g ∈ G (resp. g ∈ G∗), a sharing game (resp. feasible shar-
ing game)i sd e ﬁned for each economy e ∈ E as a non-cooperative game
(N,A,g,e). Fixing the set of players N and their strategy sets A,w es i m p l y
denote a sharing game (resp. feasible sharing game) (N,A,g,e) by (g,e).
Given a proﬁle (m,x) ∈ A,l e t(m0
i,m−i,x 0
i,x−i) ∈ A be another strategy
proﬁle that is obtained by replacing the i-th component (mi,x i) of (m,x)
with (m0
i,x 0
i).Ap r o ﬁle (m∗,x∗) ∈ A is a (pure-strategy) Nash equilib-
rium of (g,e) if for each i ∈ N and each (mi,x i) ∈ Ai, ui (x∗









.L e tNE(g,e) denote the set of Nash equilibria
of (g,e).A na l l o c a t i o nz =( xi,y i)i∈N ∈ Zn is a Nash equilibrium allo-
cation of (g,e) if there exists m ∈ M such that (m,x) ∈ NE(g,e) and
y = g(m,x),w h e r ex =( xi)i∈N and y =( yi)i∈N.L e tNA(g,e) denote the
set of Nash equilibrium allocations of (g,e).
3 Implementation: A General Characteriza-
tion
We introduce two axioms as necessary conditions for Nash implementation.
The ﬁrst axiom is the well-known monotonicity condition. Given ui ∈ U
and zi ∈ Z,l e tL(zi,u i) ≡ {z0
i ∈ Z | ui (z0
i) ≤ ui (zi)} be the weakly lower
contour set for ui at zi. Then:
Monotonicity (M): For each e=( u,s),e0 =( u0,s) ∈ E and each z∈ ϕ(e),
if L(zi,u i) ⊆ L(zi,u 0
i) for each i ∈ N,t h e nz∈ ϕ(u0,s).
This condition is slightly weaker than Maskin Monotonicity (Maskin 1999),
since in the latter condition, the lower contour set of each agent is deﬁned
over the set of feasible allocations.
The second axiom is relevant to the change in individual skills.
Non-manipulability of Irrelevant Skills (NIS): For each e=( u,s) ∈ E
and each z∈ ϕ(e),f o re a c he0 =( u,s0) ∈ E where s0
i = si for each i ∈ N
with xi > 0, if z∈ P (e0)\ϕ(e0), then for each i ∈ N with s0
i 6= si,t h e r ei s
no z0
i ∈ Z such that (z0
i,z−i) ∈ ϕ(e0).
8That is, suppose that the current economy changes, due to the change of
someone’s skill, where this agent supplies no labor hour in the current allo-
cation, but this allocation is still eﬃcient after this change of economy. Then,
if this allocation is no longer ϕ-optimal, we can ﬁnd no other ϕ-optimal al-
location just by replacing this agent’s consumption bundle.
If the proﬁle of individual skills is known to the planner, then the frame-
work can be reduced to the classical framework of Maskin (1999). In this case,
it follows from Sjöström (1991) that, assuming that any SCC selects interior
feasible allocations, an SCC is implementable if and only if it satisﬁes M,
w h i c hi st r u ee v e ni nn =2 . In contrast, if the proﬁle of individual skills may
be unknown to the planner, this characterization no longer holds. However,
even in such an extended framework, we show that, under Assumption 1,
an SCC is implementable if and only if it satisﬁes M and NIS.
Theorem 1: If an SCC ϕ is implementable,t h e nϕ satisﬁes M and NIS.
Proof. Let ϕ be an implementable SCC. Then, there exists a mechanism
γ =( A,h) such that for any e=( ui,s i)i∈N ∈ E, NA(γ,e)=ϕ(e).T h e
necessity of M is shown as usual, so we focus on the necessity of NIS.
For each e=( u,s), e0 =( ui,s 0
i)i∈N ∈ E,a n de a c hz∈ ϕ(e),l e tsj = s0
j
for each j ∈ N with xj > 0.M o r e o v e r , l e t z∈ P (e0)\ϕ(e0). Suppose for
some i ∈ N with s0
i 6= si,t h e r ee x i s t sz0
i ∈ Z such that (z0
i,z−i) ∈ ϕ(e0).
Since z∈ P (e0) and (z0
i,z−i) ∈ ϕ(e0) ⊆ P (e0), ui (zi)=ui (z0
i) holds. By
implementability of ϕ,t h e r ee x i s ta ∈ NE(γ,e) and a0 ∈ NE(γ,e0) such
that h(a)= z and h(a0)=( z0
i,z−i).B y d e ﬁnition of Nash equilibrium,













Since ui (zi)=ui (z0
i) holds, L(zi,u i)=L(z0
i,u i). The last equation implies
that a ∈ NE(γ,e0),a n ds oz∈ NA(γ,e0), which is a contradiction from
implementability of ϕ,s i n c ez/ ∈ ϕ(e0).T h u s ,ϕ satisﬁes NIS.
Theorem 2: Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, if an SCC ϕ satisﬁes M and
NIS,t h e nϕ is implementable by a sharing mechanism.
Let us construct a feasible sharing mechanism, which is used in the
proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix A. Given x ∈ [0, ¯ x]
n and i ∈ N,l e t
π(x−i) ≡ max
©xj+¯ x
2 | xj < ¯ x for j 6= i
ª
. We construct the following two
auxiliary outcome functions:
9• Let gy be such that for each s ∈ Sn,e a c h(σ,x,y) ∈ Sn ×[0, ¯ x]
n ×Rn
+,










if xi = π(x−i) and
yi > max{f (
P
σk¯ x), max{yj | j 6= i}},
0 otherwise.
• Let gσ be such that for each s ∈ Sn,e a c h(σ,x,y) ∈ Sn ×[0, ¯ x]
n ×Rn
+,






skxk) if xi =0 , yi =0 ,a n dσi > σj for each j 6= i,
0 otherwise.
The function gy assigns all of the produced output12 to only one agent who
provides the maximal positive amount, but less than ¯ x, of labor time and
reports a maximal demand for the output. The funciton gσ assigns all of
the produced output to only one agent who demands no output, reports the
highest skill, and does not work.










where α =‘ + ’i fx0
i >x i;a n dα =‘−’i fx0
i <x i.G i v e n (u,σ,x,y) ∈



























i) such that ((x0
i,x −i),(y0















































Denote the upper boundary of L(zi,u i) by ∂L(zi,u i).W ed e ﬁne g∗ ∈ G
with Mi ≡ Un ×S×R+ , with generic element (ui,σ,y),f o re a c hi ∈ N,a s
follows:













12We implicitly assume that the mechanism coordinator can hold all of the produced
output after the production process, although he may not monitor that process perfectly.
101-1: there exists u ∈ Un such that ui = u for each i ∈ N and
1-1-a): if (x,y) ∈ ϕ(u,σ),t h e ng∗ (τ)=y,
1-1-b): if (x,y) ∈ P (u,σ)\ϕ(u,σ),t h e ng∗ (τ)=0,
1-2: there exists j ∈ N such that ui = u for each i 6= j, (x,y) / ∈ ϕ(uj,σ),
and
1-2-a): if j ∈ N (u,σ,x,y),t h e ng∗
i (τ)=0for each i 6= j,a n dg∗
j (τ)= ½
y00

















































1-2-b): if j/ ∈ N (u,σ,x,y) and there exists (x0
j,y0









∈ P (uj,σ),t h e ng∗










1-3: in any other case, g∗ (τ)=gy (σ,x,y),
Rule 2: if f (
P
σkxk) 6= f (
P
skxk),t h e ng∗ (τ)=gσ (σ,x,y).
Note that this g∗ is not feasible, due to Rule 1-2-a).
Corollary 1: Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, an SCC ϕ is implementable if
and only if ϕ satisﬁes M and NIS.
4 Implementation by Natural Sharing Mech-
anisms
We deﬁne Nash implementation by natural sharing mechanisms. The set of
price vectors is the unit simplex ∆ ≡ {p =( px,p y) ∈ R+ × R+ | px + py =1 },
where px represents the price of labor (measured in eﬃciency units) and py
the price of output.
Deﬁnition 1: Av e c t o rp ∈ ∆ is an eﬃciency price for z=( x,y) ∈ Zn at
e=( u,s) ∈ E if
(i) for each x0 ∈ R+, pyf (x0) − pxx0 ≤
P
(pyyi − pxsixi);
11(ii) for each i ∈ N and each z0
i ∈ Z,i f ui (z0




The set of eﬃciency prices for z at e is denoted by ∆P (e,z).G i v e ns∈ Sn,
z=( x,y) ∈ Zn,a n dp ∈ ∆,l e tB (p,si,z i) ≡ {z0
i ∈ Z | pyy0
i − pxsix0
i ≤ pyyi − pxsixi}.
Deﬁnition 2: An SCC ϕ is naturally implementable, if there exists a feasi-
ble sharing mechanism g ∈ G∗ with Ai = ∆×S×[0, ¯ x]×R+ (∀i ∈ N)s u c h
that:
(i) g implements ϕ in Nash equilibria;
(ii) g is forthright: for each e =( u,s) ∈ E and each (x,y) ∈ ϕ(e),t h e r e
exists p ∈ ∆P (u,s,x,y) such that (ρ,s,x,y) ∈ NE(g,e) and g(ρ,s,x,y)=
y with ρ =( ρi)i∈N =( p,...,p);
(iii) for each e =( u,s) ∈ E,i f(ρ,s,x,y) ∈ NE(g,e) and g(ρ,s,x,y)=y
such that ρ =( ρi)i∈N =( p,...,p) ∈
¡
∆P (u,s,x,y)






























∈ B (p,si,z i).
Let us call a feasible sharing mechanism satisfying Deﬁnition 2 a natural
sharing mechanism.
Two new axioms are introduced as necessary conditions for natural im-
plementation. As a preliminary step, given p ∈ ∆ and (s,z) ∈ Sn × Zn,l e t
P−1 (p,s,z) ≡
©
u ∈ Un | z ∈ P (u,s) and p ∈ ∆P (u,s,z)
ª
.
Supporting Price Independence (SPI) [Yoshihara (1998); Gaspart (1998)]:
For each e =( u,s) ∈ E and each z ∈ ϕ(e), there exists p ∈ ∆P (e,z) such
that for each e0 =( u0,s) ∈ E, if p ∈ ∆P (e0,z),t h e nz ∈ ϕ(e0).
Let ∆SPI (u,s,z) ≡
©
p ∈ ∆P (u,s,z) | ∀u0 ∈ Un s.t. p ∈ ∆P (u0,s,z), z ∈
ϕ(u0,s)} for z ∈ ϕ(u,s).
Non-manipulability of Irrelevant Skills∗ (NIS∗): For each e =( u,s) ∈
E and each z ∈ ϕ(e), there exists p ∈ ∆P (e,z) such that for each s0 ∈ Sn
where s0
i = si for each i ∈ N with xi > 0, and each u0 ∈ P−1 (p,s0,z),i f
z ∈ P (u0,s0)\ϕ(u0,s0), then for each i ∈ N with s0




12Note that NIS∗ implies NIS.
Theorem 3: If an SCC ϕ is naturally implementable,t h e nϕ satisﬁes SPI
and NIS∗.
Proof. Let ϕ be an SCC that is naturally implementable. Then, there
exists g ∈ G∗ that satisﬁes conditions (i)-(iii) in Deﬁnition 2. The necessity
of SPI is shown as in Yamada and Yoshihara (2007).
Show the necessity of NIS∗.G i v e n e =( u,s) ∈ E and e0 =( u0,s0)=
(u0
i,s 0
i)i∈N ∈ E,l e tz =( xi,y i)i∈N ∈ ϕ(e), s0
i = si for each i ∈ N with xi > 0,
and there exist p ∈ ∆P (e,z)∩∆P (e0,z). Suppose that z ∈ P (e0)\ϕ(e0) and
there exists z0





∈ ϕ(e0).S i n c eϕ satisﬁes SPI, z ∈
P (e0)\ϕ(e0) implies that there exists j ∈ N with xj =0and s0
j 6= sj.F r o m
(ii), for ρ =( ρi)i∈N with ρi = p for each i ∈ N, τ =( ρ,s,x,y) ∈ NE(g,e)
















for each i ∈ N and each τ∗
i ∈ ∆×S×[0, ¯ x]×R+.
Moreover, from (ii), τ0 =( ρ,s0,x0,y0) ∈ NE(g,e0) and g(τ0)=y0,w h e r e
x0
i = xi and y0

























for each i ∈ N and each τ∗
i ∈ ∆×S×[0, ¯ x]×R+.























































































































y. Hence, z ∈ NA(g,e0)=ϕ(e0), which is a contradiction. Thus, z ∈
P (e0)\ϕ(e0) implies that there is no z0






Theorem 4: Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, if an SCC ϕ satisﬁes SPI and
NIS∗,t h e nϕ is naturally implementable.
Given p ∈ ∆ and (σ,x,y) ∈ Sn × [0, ¯ x]
n × Rn
+,l e tϕ−1 (p,σ,x,y) ≡
13©
u ∈ Un | (x,y) ∈ ϕ(u,σ) and p ∈ ∆SPI (u,σ,x,y)
ª
.G i v e np ∈ ∆ and
(σ,x,y) ∈ Sn×[0, ¯ x]
n×Rn
+,l e tN (p,σ,x,y) ≡ {i ∈ N | ∃(x0
i,y0











Given a strategy proﬁle (ρ,σ,x,y) such that for each j, ρj = p, i ∈
N (p,σ,x,y) is called a “potential deviator,” for the following reason. Sup-
pose ϕ−1 (p,σ,x,y)=∅ and N (p,σ,x,y) 6= ∅.T h e ﬁrst equation implies
that (ρ,σ,x,y) is inconsistent with ϕ. The second equation N (p,σ,x,y) 6= ∅
implies that there is an agent i who can switch his strategy to another one
(ρi,σi,x 0
i,y0









with ϕ.T h a t i s , i t m a y b e t h i s a g e n t i who makes the current strategy
proﬁle (ρ,σ,x,y) inconsistent with ϕ.T h i sm e a n st h a ti ∈ N (p,σ,x,y) is a
“potential deviator.”
We deﬁne g∗∗ ∈ G∗ with Mi ≡ 4×S×R+ for each i ∈ N, as follows:
For each s ∈ Sn and each τ =( ρ,σ,x,y) ∈ 4n ×S n × [0, ¯ x]
n × Rn
+,





1-1: there exists p ∈ ∆ such that ρi = p for each i ∈ N and
1-1-a): if ϕ−1 (p,σ,x,y) 6= ∅,t h e ng∗∗ (τ)=y,
1-1-b): if ϕ−1 (p,σ,x,y)=∅ and P−1 (p,σ,x,y) 6= ∅,t h e ng∗∗ (τ)=0,
1-2: there exist j ∈ N and p ∈ ∆ such that ρi = p for each i 6= j,
ϕ−1 (p,σ,x,y)=∅,a n d
1-2-a): if j ∈ N (p,σ,x,y),t h e ng∗






















































6= ∅,t h e ng∗∗










1-3: in any other case, g∗∗ (τ)=gy (σ,x,y),
Rule 2: if f (
P
σkxk) 6= f (
P
skxk),t h e ng∗∗ (τ)=gσ (σ,x,y).
This mechanism works well even in economies of two agents.
Corollary 2: Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, an SCC ϕ is naturally imple-
mentable if and only if ϕ satisﬁes SPI and NIS∗.
14If each agent i can control her contribution by selecting e si ∈ [0,s i], Corollary
2 still applies. Though we only focus on Nash implementation, it can be
shown, by slightly reformulating g∗∗ as a two-stage mechanism, that any
SCC is triply naturally implementable in Nash, strong Nash, and subgame
perfect equilibria if and only if it satisﬁes SPI and NIS∗.
In the above characterization, the mechanism g∗∗ satisﬁes neither the
balancedness [Hurwicz et al. (1995)] nor the best response property [Jackson
et. al (1994)]. However, as shown in Appendix (B), no SCC is implementable
by balanced natural sharing mechanisms. This suggests that there is a trade-
oﬀ between labor sovereignty and balancedness of mechanisms. Given the
primary relevance of the former condition, the latter condition is not required
in this paper. Also, as shown in Appendix (C), no SCC is implementable by
a natural sharing mechanism satisfying the best response property.
Finally, let us deﬁne Nash implementation by simple mechanisms.
Deﬁnition 3: An SCC ϕ is simply implementable, if there exists a feasible
sharing mechanism g ∈ G∗ with Ai = ∆ ×S×[0, ¯ x] × R+ (∀i ∈ N)s u c h
that Deﬁnition 2-(i), (ii), and (iii), and
(iv) for each e =( u,s) ∈ E,i f(ρ,s,x,y) ∈ NE(g,e),t h e nf o re a c h
e0 =( u,s0) ∈ E where s0
i = si for each i ∈ N with xi > 0,[ (ρ,s0,x,y) ∈
NE(g,e0) and g(ρ,s0,x,y)=g(ρ,s,x,y)].
This additional condition (iv) requires that the sharing of outputs is inde-
pendent of the skill parameters stated by “non-working” agents. It simpliﬁes
the sharing process, but it is not necessarily an indispensable condition.
The next axiom was introduced by Yamada and Yoshihara (2007) for
simple implementation.
Independence of Unused Skills (IUS) [Yamada and Yoshihara (2007)]:
For each e =( u,s) ∈ E and each z ∈ ϕ(e), there exists p ∈ ∆P (e,z) such
that for each e0 =( u,s0) ∈ E where s0
i = si for each i ∈ N with xi > 0, if
p ∈ ∆P (e0,z),t h e nz ∈ ϕ(e0).
Note that SPI and IUS imply SPI and NIS∗, though IUS and NIS∗ are
independent of each other.
Using this condition, Yamada and Yoshihara (2007) gave the characteri-
zation for simple implementation as follows:
Proposition 1: Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, an SCC ϕ is simply imple-
mentable if and only if ϕ satisﬁes SPI and IUS.
15More precisely, Yamada and Yoshihara (2007) characterized triple implemen-
tation by simple mechanisms in Nash, strong, and subgame perfect equilibria.
However, in this model of economies, triple implementation by simple mecha-
nisms is equivalent to simple implementation, because both are characterized
by SPI and IUS.
5A p p l i c a t i o n s
As discussed in the present literature such as Maskin (1999) and Yamada
Yoshihara (2007), there are well-known SCCs which satisfy M and/or SPI.
Thus, to see which SCCs are implementable and/or implementable by nat-
ural mechanisms, it is suﬃcient to examine which of such SCCss a t i s ﬁes NIS
and/or NIS∗.
We show that most of equitable SCCs are non-implementable by simple
mechanisms. Remember that in production economies with unequal skills,
the no-envy and eﬃcient solution [Foley (1967)] is not well-deﬁned, though
the no-envy principle is compatible with M, while the egalitarian-equivalence
[Pazner and Schmeidler (1978)] is incompatible. Thus, we may need to con-
sider a weaker version of the no-envy principle for deﬁning equitable SCCs.
As one such examples, consider the equal-opportunity-for-budget-set (EOB)
principle, which is a condition for the basic income policy (Van Parijs 1995),
and can be formulated as follows:
Set-inclusion Undomination (SIU):13 For each e=( u,s) ∈ E and each
z∈ ϕ(e), there exists p ∈ ∆P (e,z) such that for each i,j ∈ N, neither
B (p,si,z i) ( B (p,sj,z j) nor B (p,si,z i) ) B (p,sj,z j).
Any SCC satisfying the no-envy principle also satisﬁes SIU.P a r e t oe ﬃ-
ciency and SIU are compatible. For instance, the e u-reference welfare equiv-
alent budget solution [Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996)] satisﬁes SIU.
Deﬁnition 4: An SCC is the e u-reference welfare equivalent budget solution
ϕe u-RWEB if for each e=( u,s) ∈ E, z∈ ϕe u-RWEB (e) implies that z∈ P (e);
and there exists p =( px,p y) ∈ ∆P (e,z) for z at e=( u,s) ∈ E such that for
any i,j ∈ N, maxz0∈B(p,si,zi) e u(z0)=m a x z0∈B(p,sj,zj) e u(z0).
13Van Parijs (1995) formulated the EOB principle as Undominated Diversity [Parijs
(1995)], which is stronger than SIU.
16The following corollary shows that ϕe u-RWEB is not simply implementable:
Corollary 3: No SCC satisfying SIU is simply implementable.
Proof. W.l.o.g., suppose that ϕ satisﬁes SPI.L e t(u,s) ∈ E and z∈ ϕ(u,s)
such that for some i ∈ N, xi =0 .L e tp ∈ ∆P (u,s,z) and for any j ∈ N,
neither B (p,si,z i) ( B (p,sj,z j) nor B (p,si,z i) ) B (p,sj,z j).
If si > mink∈N {sk | k ∈ N},t h e nc o n s i d e r(u,s0) such that s0
−i =s−i
and s0
i =m i n k∈N {sk | k ∈ N}.L e t mink∈N {sk | k ∈ N} = sj. Then, p ∈
∆P (u,s0,z),b u tB (p,s0
i,z i) ( B (p,sj,z j).T h u s , z/ ∈ ϕ(u,s0),w h i c hi m -
plies that ϕ dose not satisfy IUS.
If si ≤ mink∈N {sk | k ∈ N}, then consider (u,s0) such that s0
−i =s−i
and s0
i > mink∈N {sk | k ∈ N}\{si}.C o n s i d e r u0 ∈ Un such that p ∈
∆P (u0,s0,z) with u0
−i =u−i. Then, p ∈ ∆P (u0,s,z), which implies that z∈
ϕ(u0,s),b e c a u s eϕ satisﬁes SPI.N o t et h a tt h e r ee x i s t smink∈N {sk | k ∈ N}\{si} =
sj. Then, B (p,s0
i,z i) ) B (p,sj,z j),s ot h a tz/ ∈ ϕ(u0,s0).A sp ∈ ∆P (u0,s0,z),
this implies that ϕ dose not satisfy IUS.
Thus, if SIU is requested as a minimal condition of equity, then no eq-
uitable SCC is simply implementable. However, as we see, the condition
of simple mechanisms is stringent, and it seems suﬃcient to consider nat-
ural mechanisms. Actually, in contrast to the case of simple implementation,
there are many equitable SCCs which are naturally implementable.
To see this, let ϕ be an SCC.T h i sϕ meets non-discrimination if, for any
(u,s) ∈ E,a n yz∈ ϕ(u,s),a n da n yz0 ∈ P (u,s) such that ui (zi)=ui (z0
i)
for each i ∈ N, z0 ∈ ϕ(u,s) holds. We have:
Lemma 1: If an SCC satisﬁes non-discrimination, then it satisﬁes NIS∗.
Proof. Let ϕ be an SCC not satisfying NIS∗.F o r e a c h e=( u,s), e0 =
(u0
i,s 0
i)i∈N ∈ E,a n de a c hz∈ ϕ(e),l e tsj = s0
j for each j ∈ N with xj > 0,
and let there exist p ∈ ∆P (e,z)∩∆P (e0,z).M o r e o v e r ,l e tz∈ P (e0)\ϕ(e0).
Suppose for some i ∈ N with s0
i 6= si,t h e r ee x i s t sz0
i ∈ Z such that (z0
i,z−i) ∈
ϕ(e0).S i n c ez∈ P (e0) and (z0




Thus, since ϕ satisﬁes non-discrimination, z∈ ϕ(e0), which demonstrates a
contradiction.
Note that there is an SCC which does not satisfy non-discrimination, but
satisﬁes NIS∗. For instance, the proportional solution [Roemer and Silvestre
(1993); Roemer (1996; Chapter 5)] is such an SCC.
17Corollary 4: Any SCC satisfying non-discrimination is implementable if it
satisﬁes M. M o r e o v e r ,i ti snaturally implementable if it satisﬁes SPI.
Thus, an equitable solution satisfying non-discrimination is naturally imple-
mentable if it satisﬁes SPI.T h e r ea r em a n ys u c hSCCs, one such example
is ϕe u-RWEB.
Is there an SCC which satisﬁes M but does not satisfy NIS? First of all,
let us consider the case that the production function f is strictly concave.
Then:
Lemma 2: Let f be strictly concave. Then, any SCC satisﬁes NIS∗.
Proof. Take any e=( u,s), e0 =( u0,s0) ∈ E such that (i) sj = s0
j for each
j ∈ N\{1},a n ds1 6= s0
1.L e t z∈ ϕ(e) with z1 =( 0 ,y 1), and let there
exist p ∈ ∆P (e,z) ∩ ∆P (e0,z).S u p p o s e z∈ P (e0)\ϕ(e0). Then, given
z−1, there is no other consumption bundle z0
1 such that (z0
1,z−1) ∈ P (e0)
holds. This is because f is strictly concave, so that for any eﬃciency price
p ∈ ∆P (e0,z), z1 is the unique intersection point of ∂B (p,s0
1,z 1) and the set n
(x,y) ∈ Z | y = f
³P
j6=1 sjxj + s0
1x
´o
.T h u s ,ϕ satisﬁes NIS∗.
Corollary 5: Let f be strictly concave. Then, an SCC is implementable if
a n do n l yi fi ts a t i s ﬁes M. Moreover, it is naturally implementable if and
only if it satisﬁes SPI.
Second, consider the case that the production function f is not strictly
concave. In this case, we can ﬁnd an SCC which satisﬁes M but does not
satisfy NIS.
To see this, let us assume that f is linear, without loss of generality.
Given s=( si)i∈N ∈ Sn,l e ty∗ ≡ (y∗
i) ∈ Rn be called a distribution with









Denote the set of such distributions with zero-labor at s by Y∗ (s).G i v e n
y∗ ∈ Y∗ (s) and e=( ui,s i)i∈N ∈ E,a n dp ∈ ∆,w ec a nd e ﬁne a pro-
ﬁle of budget sets as B (p,s,y∗) ≡ (B (p,si,y ∗
i))i∈N,w h e r eB (p,si,y∗
i) ≡
{(x,y) ∈ Z | pyy − pxsix ≤ pyy∗





x holds for any x>0. This is because f is linear. Let p∗ be
such a price. Then, for each i ∈ N, consider the following problem:





i;e) be a solution of this problem for each i ∈ N.M o r e o v e r , l e t
Zi (y∗
i;e) be the set of such solutions for each i ∈ N. Then, an allocation
z (y∗;e) ≡ (zi (y∗
i;e))i∈N,w h e r ezi (y∗
i;e) ∈ Zi (y∗
i;e) for each i ∈ N,i sa
Pareto eﬃcient allocation for e.T h u s ,f o re a c he=( ui,s i)i∈N ∈ E, P (e)=
{z (y∗;e) | y∗ ∈ Y∗ (s)} holds. Given s∈ Sn, there exists an agent whose
skill level is the lowest at s within the population. Denote such an agent at





∗ (s) with z (y
∗;e) ∈ P (e).
Note that this problem is well-deﬁned, since P (e) is compact and any Pareto
eﬃcient allocation has its corresponding distribution with zero-labor in Y∗ (s).
Let y∗ (e) ∈ Y∗ (s) be a solution of this problem, and denote the set of such
y∗ (e) by y∗ (e). Note for any y∗ (e),y0∗ (e) ∈ y∗ (e), y∗
i(s) (e)=y0∗
i(s) (e)
holds. Denote this number by ymax∗
i(s) (e). Then:
Deﬁnition 5: An SCC is the maximal workfare solution ϕWF if for each
e=( u,s) ∈ E, z∈ ϕWF (e) implies that there exists y∗ (e) ∈ y∗ (e) such
that z=z(y∗ (e);e), and for any e y
∗ (e) ∈ y∗ (e) and any z0 ≡z(e y
∗ (e);e) ∈






































, since the welfare payment y∗
i(s) (e)
via ϕWF is to urge the lowest skill agent to work. In other words, ϕWF pro-
vides the lowest skill agents with the maximal welfare payment if and only
if they work as much as possible, which is the reason why we call ϕWF the
workfare solution.
By this deﬁnition, it is shown that ϕWF does not satisfy non-discrimination.
Moreover:
Lemma 3: Let f be linear. Then, ϕWF is an SCC which satisﬁes M,b u t
does not satisfy NIS.
Proof. It is easy to check that ϕWF satisﬁes M. Let us check that ϕWF does
not satisfy NIS.T a k ee=( u,s), e0 =( u,s0) ∈ E such that (i) sj = s0
j and
s1 <s 0
1 <s j for each j ∈ N\{1}; (ii) supplying zero labor hour is the unique
19action for agent 1 to maximize his utility u1 over B (p∗,s 1,y ∗
1 (e)); and (iii)
selecting anyone from the set [0,x 0
1] is to maximize u1 over B (p∗,s 0
1,y∗
1 (e0)).
Thus, note that agent 1 has the lowest skill both in e and e0.
Let z∈ ϕWF (e).T h e n ,z1 =( 0 ,y ∗
1 (e)) by (ii). Note z∈ P (e0). Hence,
y∗
1 (e) ≤ y∗
1 (e0) holds. If y∗
1 (e) <y ∗
1 (e0),t h e nt h ea l l o c a t i o n((0,y∗
1 (e0)),z−1 (y∗ (e0);e0)) ∈
P (e0) is also Pareto eﬃcient for e, which is a contradiction from the deﬁnition
of y∗
1 (e).T h u s ,y∗
1 (e)=y∗















∈ ϕWF (e0) and z/ ∈ ϕWF (e0).T h i s
implies that ϕWF does not satisfy NIS.
Corollary 6: Let f be linear. Then, ϕWF is not implementable.
Note that ϕWF is Nash-implementable if skills are not private information,
since ϕWF satisﬁes M. Thus, Corollary 6 implies that, introducing the private
information of skills makes the set of implementable SCCs properly shrink.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
We have characterized Nash implementation in production economies with
unequal labor skills. Firstly, without any restriction of available mecha-
nisms, we have characterized the class of eﬃcient SCCs which are Nash-
implementable in such economies. Then, we have seen that Maskin monotonic-
ity alone is no longer suﬃcient for Nash implementation, and there is a
Maskin-monotonic eﬃcient SCC which is not implementable in these economies.
Secondly, we have deﬁned natural mechanisms in these economies, and then
characterized the class of eﬃcient SCCs which are Nash-implementable by
natural mechanisms. By this characterization, many eﬃcient and equitable
SCCs are shown to be naturally implementable, though most of them were
known to be non-implementable by simple mechanisms in the present liter-
ature. The deﬁnition of natural mechanisms in this paper allows that the
mechanisms satisfy neither the balancedness nor the best response property.
However, the loss of the former property is inevitable when we are interested
in mechanisms having the labor sovereign property, whereas the loss of the
latter property is also inevitable for implementation by natural mechanisms.
This paper presumes a simple setting of one-input and one-output economies
with unequal skills among agents, and workability of the constructed mech-
anisms depends on this simple model. However, the main conclusions of this
20paper can be generalized to more complicated models of multi-input and
multi-outputs economies with unequal skills, albeit at the cost of a substan-
tial increase in unessential technicalities.
7 Appendix A
1. Proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma A1: Let Assumption 1 hold. Let g∗ ∈ G be as above. Given





n ×S n × [0, ¯ x]
n × Rn
+ be a Nash




skxk). Then, for each
i ∈ N with xi > 0, σi = si.
This proof is given as of Lemma 1 in Yamada and Yoshihara (2007).
Lemma A2: Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, g∗ implements any SCC ϕ
satisfying M and NIS in Nash equilibria.
Proof. Let ϕ be an SCC satisfying M and NIS.L e te =( u,s) ∈ E.





∈ (Un ×S×[0, ¯ x] × R+)
n be such that ui = u for









∈ Un ×S×[0, ¯ x] × R+. From Assumption 1 and






=0 , it implies the worst
outcome for j.
If τ0
j induces Rule 2, then x0






=0 .I f τ0
j induces




















j 6= sj. The former implies s0
j = sj and y0
j ≤ f
³P
i6=j six + s0
jx
´
.T h u s ,






=0 .I f τ0
j induces Rule 1-2-b, then xj =0and
s0








j induces Rule 1-2-a), then either x0
j > 0 or x0
j =0and s0
j 6= sj.I n
the former case, since s0























































j ≤ yj − p− (xj;x−j,s)xj
hold. Let p =( px,p y) be the eﬃciency price which supports z as a ϕ-
optimal allocation at e. Then, yj −
px





















j ≤ yj −
px










∈ L(zj,u j). Finally, if τ0





















≤ uj (zj).I ns u m m a r y ,j has no incentive to switch to τ0
j.





Suppose that τ induces Rule 2. Then, either N0 (x) ≡ {i ∈ N | xi =0 } =
∅ or N0 (x) 6= ∅.I fN0 (x)=∅,t h e nf o re a c hi ∈ N, g∗
i (τ)=0 . Then, if




i6=k sixi,t h e n(n − 1) · (
P
σixi)=( n − 1) ·
(
P













j > max{σi | i 6= j},
x0
j =0 ,a n dy0






> 0 under Rule 2.
Let N0 (x) 6= ∅ with #N0 (x) ≥ 2. Then, for each j ∈ N0 (x),i fj’s
deviating strategy τ0
j is such that for each i 6= j, σ0















skxk) under Rule 2.





i∈N\(N0(x)∪{j}) sixi.T h u s , j can switch
to τ0






> 0 under Rule 2. This can be shown in a similar
way to the case of N0 (x)=∅.
Let N0 (x)={i} and N\N0 (x)={j}.I f yi > 0, then switching i’s
strategy to σ0
i > σj, x0

























under Rule 1-3. In summary, τ does not induce Rule 2.
Suppose that τ induces Rule 1-2 or 1-3. Then, there exists j ∈ N
such that g∗
j (τ)=0 .B y L e m m a A 1 , σj = sj or xj =0 . Suppose τ
induces Rule 1-2. Then, g∗
j (τ)=0implies that yj ≤ f (
P
σkx). Then,
j can either deviate to Rule 1-3 with σ0
j = sj, x0






i6=j σi¯ x + σ0
j¯ x
´









under Rule 1-2 by y0
j >f
³P
i6=j σi¯ x + σ0
j¯ x
´
.S u p p o s e τ induces Rule 1-3.
Then, there exists τ0






> 0 under Rule 1-3. In summary,
τ induces neither Rule 1-2 nor 1-3.
Suppose that τ induces Rule 1-1-b. Then, g∗ (τ)=0.T h e n , s o m e






> 0,w h i c hi sa
contradiction.
22Thus, τ induces Rule 1-1-a), and g∗ (τ)=y.B yd e ﬁnition of Rule 1-1-a),
(x,y) ∈ ϕ(u0,σ) where u0 =vi for all i ∈ N.S i n c eτ ∈ NE(g∗,e), σi = si
holds for any i ∈ N with xi > 0 by Lemma A1. Assume, without loss of
generality, that there exists at most one unique individual j such that xj =0 .
Let us consider the following two cases below:
Case 1: Let (x,y) ∈ P (u0,s). Then, we can show that (x,y) ∈ ϕ(u0,s).
Suppose that (x,y) / ∈ ϕ(u0,s). Then, for the individual j ∈ N with xj =0 ,












skx),t h e nNIS implies j/ ∈ N (u0,s,x,y), so that Rule 1-2-b)
can be applied. Then, if x0















i6=j sixi + sjx0
j
´´





.T h i s i m p l i e s
(x,y) / ∈ NA(g∗,(u,s)), which is a contradiction. Thus, (x,y) ∈ ϕ(u0,s).
Then, (x,y) ∈ NA(g∗,(u,s)) implies that L((xi,y i),u 0
i) ⊆ L((xi,y i),u i)
holds for each i ∈ N by Rule 1-2-a). Thus, (x,y) ∈ ϕ(u,s) by M.
Case 2: Let (x,y) / ∈ P (u0,s).S i n c e (x,y) ∈ P (u0,σ),w eh a v ef o rt h e







such that L((xi,y i),u 00
i) ) L((xi,y i),u 0




















with v00i = u00 (∀i ∈ N), g∗ (τ00)=y,w h i c hi m -
plies τ00 ∈ NE(g∗,e). Suppose (x,y) / ∈ ϕ(u00,s). Then, by the same argu-
ment as in Case 1, j can induce Rule 1-2-b), so that (x,y) / ∈ NA(g∗,(u,s)),
a contradiction. Thus, (x,y) ∈ ϕ(u00,s).T h e n , τ00 ∈ NE(g∗,e) and
(x,y) ∈ NA(g∗,(u,s)) imply that L((xi,y i),u 00
i) ⊆ L((xi,y i),u i) holds
for each i ∈ N by Rule 1-2-a). Thus, (x,y) ∈ ϕ(u,s) by M.
Proof of Theorem 2. From Lemma A2, we obtain the desired result.
2. Proof of Theorem 4.
Lemma A3: Let Assumption 1 hold. Let g∗∗ ∈ G∗ be as previously deﬁned.
Given (u,s) ∈ E, let (ρ,σ,x,y) ∈ 4n×Sn×[0, ¯ x]
n×Rn
+ b eaN a s he q u i l i b r i u m




skxk).T h e n ,f o re a c hi ∈ N with
xi > 0, σi = si.
The proof of Lemma A3 is given in a similar way to that of Lemma A1.
Lemma A4: Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, g∗∗ implements any SCC ϕ
satisfying SPI and NIS∗ in Nash equilibria.
23Proof. Let ϕ be a SCC satisfying SPI and NIS∗.L e te =( u,s) ∈ E.
(1) First, we show that ϕ(e) ⊆ NA(g∗∗,e).L e t z =( x,y) ∈ ϕ(e).L e t
τ =( ρ,s,x,y) ∈ (∆ ×S×[0, ¯ x] × R+)
n be such that ρi = p =( px,p y) for
each i ∈ N and p ∈ ∆SPI (u,s,z). Then, g∗∗ (τ)=y from Rule 1-1. Suppose








∈ ∆ ×S×[0, ¯ x] × R+.
If τ0






=0 ,a ss i m -
ilarly shown in the corresponding part of the proof of Lemma A2. If τ0
j induces
Rule 1-2-b), then σ0






























= N (p,s,x,y) and j ∈ N (p,s,x,y).T h u s ,i f
τ0
j induces Rule 1-2-b), σ0
j 6= sj and x0






















In summary, j has no incentive to switch to τ0
j.
(2) Second, show NA(g∗∗,e) ⊆ ϕ(e).L e tτ =( ρ,σ,x,y) ∈ NE(g∗∗,e).
Note that τ can induce neither of Rule 1-1-b, Rule 1-2, Rule 1-3, or Rule
2, which is shown by almost the same way as the corresponding cases of Rule
1-1-b, Rule 1-2, Rule 1-3, and Rule 2 in the proof of Lemma A2.
Thus, τ induces Rule 1-1-a), and g∗∗ (τ)=y.B yd e ﬁnition of Rule 1-1-
a), there exists u0 ∈ Un such that for each i ∈ N, ρi = p ∈ ∆SPI (u0,σ,x,y)
and (x,y) ∈ ϕ(u0,σ).S i n c e τ ∈ NE(g∗∗,e), σi = si holds for any i ∈ N
with xi > 0 by Lemma A3. Assume, without loss of generality, that there
exists at most one unique individual j such that xj =0 . Let us consider the
following two cases below:
Case 1: Let (x,w) ∈ P (u0,s). Then, we can show that (x,y) ∈ ϕ(u0,s).
Suppose that (x,y) / ∈ ϕ(u0,s). Then, for the individual j ∈ N with xj =0 ,
σj 6= sj. In this case, j/ ∈ N (p,s,x,y) follows from NIS∗. This is because,
ﬁrst of all, by SPI, (x,y) / ∈ ϕ(u0,s) together with p ∈ ∆P (u0,s,x,y) im-
ply that p/ ∈ ∆SPI (u00,s,x,y) holds for any u00 with p ∈ ∆P (u00,s,x,y).
In fact, if p ∈ ∆P (u0,s,x,y) and p ∈ ∆SPI (u00,s,x,y) for some u00,t h e n
(x,y) ∈ ϕ(u0,s) by SPI, which is a contradiction. Thus, ϕ−1 (p,s,x,y)=∅.
Hence, for any u00 ∈ P−1 (p,s,x,y), (x,y) / ∈ ϕ(u00,s). Then, it follows


































∈ ϕ(u00,s) and u00 / ∈ P−1 (p,s,x,y).








































/ ∈ ϕ(u000,s), which is a contradiction. Thus,
j/ ∈ N (p,s,x,y) holds.























= N (p,s,x,y),s ot h a t
Rule 1-2-b) is induced. If x0
























tion from τ ∈ NE(g∗∗,e).T h u s ,(x,y) ∈ ϕ(u0,s).N o t et h a tH (s,(xi,y i),p) ⊆
L((xi,y i),u i) holds for each i ∈ N with xi > 0 by Rule 1-2-a). Moreover,
if it does not hold H (s,(xj,y j),p) ⊆ L((xj,y j),u j) for j ∈ N with xj =0 ,




















/ ∈ L((xj,y j),u j) under Rule
1-2-a), which is again a contradiction from τ ∈ NE(g∗∗,e).T h u s ,(x,y) ∈
P (u,s),a n d(x,y) ∈ ϕ(u,s) by SPI.
Case 2: Let (x,y) / ∈ P (u0,s).S i n c e(x,y) ∈ P (u0,σ), for the individual







such that L((xi,y i),u 00
i) ) L((xi,y i),u 0















.N o t et h a ts i n c eϕ satisﬁes SPI which implies M, (x,y) ∈
ϕ(u00,σ). T h e n ,b yt h es a m ea r g u m e n ta si nC a s e1 ,(x,y) ∈ ϕ(u00,s).
Since (x,y) ∈ NA(g∗∗,(u,s)) with (ρ,σ,x,y) ∈ NE(g∗∗,e),w eh a v e ,b y
Rule 1-1-a) and 1-2-a), that (x,y) ∈ P (u,s) with p as the corresponding
eﬃciency price. Thus, since p ∈ ∆SPI (u00,s,x,y),w eh a v e(x,y) ∈ ϕ(u,s)
by SPI.
Proof of Theorem 4. By the construction of g∗∗, it is a feasible sharing
mechanism having the property of forthrightness. Thus, it satisﬁes Deﬁnition
2. From Lemma A4, we obtain the desired result.
8 Appendix B





sixi).G i v e n s ∈ Sn, (x,y) ∈ Zn,a n di ∈ N,l e tZi (s,(x,y),p) ≡ ©
(x0
i,y0











Condition PQP: For each e =( u,s) ∈ E and each (p,x,y) ∈ ∆ × Zn




yj and N (p,s,x,y)=N,t h e r ee x i s t sabalanced
feasible allocation z∗ ∈ Z (s) such that:
(1) for all i ∈ N, x∗
i = xi;













i), then z∗ ∈ ϕ(u∗,s).
Proposition B1: If an SCC ϕ is implementable by a balanced natural
sharing mechanism,t h e nϕ satisﬁes PQP.
Proof. Given s ∈ Sn,l e t(p,x,y) ∈ ∆×Zn be such that N (p,s,x,y)=N.
Then, for each i ∈ N and each (x0
i,y0
i) ∈ Zi (s,(x,y),p),l e tai ∈ A be such
that ai
i ≡ (p,si,x 0
i,y0
i) and ai






















NA(g,(u,s)) hold by Deﬁnition 2-(ii). Then, by Deﬁnition 2-(iii), for each








































for a∗ =( p,si,x i,y i)i∈N. Then, z∗ ∈ Z (s) is bal-
anced, since g is a balanced feasible sharing mechanism. Moreover, from the














i) ∈ Zi (s,(x,y),p) and all i ∈ N. Finally, if there exists u∗ ∈ Un






i),t h e n
a∗ ∈ NE(g,(u∗,s)). Thus, by implementability, z∗ ∈ ϕ(u∗,s).
Proposition B2: There is no SCC ϕ which satisﬁes PQP.
Proof. Take any ϕ a n da ne c o n o m ye =( u,s) ∈ E such that si =1for all
i ∈ N.M o r e o v e r ,l e tN (p,s,x,y)=N. Suppose that there exists z∗ ∈ Z (s)














i) ∈ Zi (s,(x,y),p).N o t e t h a t x∗
i = xi for each
i ∈ N. N o t ea l s ot h a tt h e r ei ss o m exN such that p being the support-



















. The latter equation follows
from the fact that, for each i ∈ N, y0
i = f
³P
































py (xi − x0
i).T h u s ,y∗


























yi.S i n c e
P
y∗
i = f (
P




















xi − xN) ≥ f (
P




xi − xN) and f (
P
xi) are suﬃciently close or even equal. For instance,
the latter is available if f is linear in the interval [min{
P
xi,x N} − ε,max{
P
xi,x N} + ε]





































xi). In this case, we see that even if P
yi <f(
P







i) for n =2 .B y N (p,s,x,y)=N,f o re a c h
i ∈ N,t h e r ei s(x0
i,y0
i) ∈ Zi (s,(x,y),p),s ot h a ty0










,a n dN (p,s,x0,y0)=N still holds. Then, we can apply






Deﬁnition C1: A natural sharing mechanism g ∈ G∗ has the best re-
sponse property, if for each e =( u,s) ∈ E,e a c h(ρ,s,x,y) ∈ A,a n de a c h









































Proposition C1: If a natural sharing mechanism g ∈ G∗ implements an
SCC satisfying SPI and NIS∗, it does not have the best response property.
Proof. Let ϕ be an SCC satisfying SPI and NIS∗ which has the following





∈ Sn and for some
z =( xi,y i)i∈N ∈ Z (s) ∩ Z (s∗) with xj =0 ,t h e r ee x i s t sp ∈ ∆ such that
ϕ−1 (p,s,z) 6= ∅, ϕ−1 (p,s∗,z)=∅,a n dP−1 (p,s∗,z) 6= ∅.L e t g ∈ G∗
be a natural sharing mechanism which implements ϕ.T a k e a n y u ∈ Un
such that p ∈ ∆P ((u,s),z) ∩ ∆P ((u,s∗),z). Then, z ∈ ϕ(u,s) and
27z ∈ P (u,s∗)\ϕ(u,s∗).S i n c eg implements ϕ, z ∈ NA(g,(u,s)) and z / ∈
NA(g,(u,s∗)).B yD e ﬁnition 2-(ii), τ =( p,si,x i,y i)i∈N ∈ NE(g,(u,s))\NE(g,(u,s∗)).





















U (zj,u j),w h e r eU (zj,u j) is the strictly upper-contour set of uj at zj.T h e
same argument should apply to any other u0 ∈ Un with p ∈ ∆P ((u0,s∗),z).





















.N o t e






∅.I nc o n t r a s t ,f o ra n yτ0
j ∈ Aj with x0








holds, since z ∈ NA(g,(u,s)) and τ ∈ NE(g,(u,s)).T h u s , f o r e a c h







































































































= {(0,y 0) | y0 >y j}. The latter follows





≤ yj holds, then there is u00
j ∈ U







































≤ yj for any τ0
j ∈
Aj with x0
j =0 .T h i si m p l i e st h a tgj (Aj,τ−j;s∗) is not closed. Then, con-
sider u∗


















has no intersection with gj (Aj,τ−j;s∗).
In this case, there is no best response strategy for j against τ−j,t h u sg does
not have the best response property.
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